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In an effort to produce interoperable products, firms frequently participate in Standard Setting 
Organizations (SSOs) to collaboratively set technical standards for products used by networks of 
consumers.  Some SSO members say they suffer from a type of holdup:  after they sink 
technology-specific investments in developing and implementing a standard using a particular 
patented technology the patent owner can set licensing terms that exploit those investments.  
These members have called on SSOs to enhance competition between patent owners by 
soliciting and considering licensing terms for competing technologies ex ante, before anointing 
one as “the standard.” However, more competitive licensing terms may dampen incentives to 
innovate.  This paper analyzes the balance between the welfare benefits of the added competition 
and the welfare costs of reduced innovation.  The model of R&D investment and standard setting 
predicts that both total welfare and consumer welfare are higher when an SSO considered 
licensing terms ex ante as long as the cost of innovation is not “high.”  The model also predicts 
that the welfare benefits of  ex ante consideration of licensing terms grow as the costs of 
innovation falls.  However, when the cost of innovation is “high” the negative welfare effects are 
always small. 1 Introduction
Technical standards add tremendous value by enabling products to interoper-
ate. A cell phone is valuable because it is compatible with a network of other
phones. Computer software is valuable, in part, because it allows us to create
documents that can be viewed by others. The technological standards that are
the foundation of such networks are commonly established through three mecha-
nisms: 1) market competition, where …rms produce incompatible products until
one …rm’s technology becomes the de facto standard; 2) collaboration between
rival producers who agree to use the same (or compatible) technology; and 3)
government intervention.1
There are many examples of each route to standardization. The triumph
of VHS technology over Betamax and the rise of Microsoft Windows are clas-
sic examples of the …rst route. The second route was used to collaboratively
develop interpretability standards for the World Wide Web and Wireless Local
Area Networks (WLAN).2 Similar standards for mobile broadband technology
are currently being developed by an industry group called the WiMAX Forum.
The third route was used when the quasi-governmental International Telecom-
munications Union (ITU) established the standard protocols for FAX machines.
The ITU also cut short a standards war between competing protocols for 56K
modems when it promoted one protocol as the industry standard. More re-
cently, the US Federal Geographic Data Committee (FGDC) has led an e¤ort
to develop compatibility among Geographic Information Systems (GIS) soft-
ware, and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has designated a
standard for high de…nition television (HDTV). See (Augereau et al. , 2004).
To ensure that their products are compatible, and thus more valuable, …rms
frequently collaborate in Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs) to choose a
particular technology as the industry standard.3 Traditionally, SSOs have been
1Economic theories of networks and standards have primarily focused on the competition
between …rms to become the de facto industry standard. A 1992 Journal of Industrial Eco-
nomics symposium on network industries (Gilbert, 1992), (Katz & Shapiro, 1986b), and (Katz
& Shapiro, 1986c) provided a theoretical foundation for an extensive literature on competition
in network industries and the implications of networks for investment and antitrust. Most
models that have considered de jure standard setting (standard setting within collaborative
standard setting organizations) have focused on the strategic issues surrounding coordination.
Firms might disagree over which technology the SSO should choose and some …rms must de-
cide between participating in collaboration or trying to establish their own de facto standard.
These issues are discussed by Joseph Farrell and various coauthors in (Farrell, 1996), (Farrell
& Saloner, 1988), and (Besen & Farrell, 1994). Two excellent summaries of the literature are
(Quelin et al. , 2001) and (David & Greenstein, 1990). (Tassey, 2000) provides useful general
background on technological standards.
2The World Wide Web Consortium (3WC) has developed numerous protocols that support
the transfer of data, photos, video, and audio across the internet. Until recently, the 3WC
required that all proprietary technology incorporated in its standards be licensed "royalty
free." The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) has also developed standard
protocols for wireless data transmission from computers to nearby internet connections.
3SSOs are also used to develop quality standards that enable adherents to commit to
a certain level of quality. Examples of such standards are board certi…cation for medical
professionals and product safety standards.
2populated by engineers who consider the technical merits of available alternative
technologies and select the "best" technology as the industry standard without
regard to what the licensing terms for any patented technologies might be. In
selecting one technology as the standard, the SSO members e¤ectively eliminate
their ability to substitute between the available technologies. When the selected
technology is under a patent, the intellectual property (IP) owner e¤ectively
becomes a monopolist.
Recently, some SSO members have complained that IP owners exploit their
positions as monopolists and set unfair or excessive licensing terms for technolo-
gies that the SSOs have adopted as industry standards.4 Dissatisfaction with the
status quo system has prompted calls for SSOs to consider the licensing terms,
as well as the technical merits, of the available technologies before "anointing"
one as the standard because the current safeguards requiring "reasonable and
non-discriminatory" (RAND) licensing terms are insu¢cient to prevent IP own-
ers from exercising any market power they gain from having their technology
selected by an SSO.5
A simple hypothetical example helps to illustrate the point. An SSO wants to
develop a standard method of attaching peripheral devices to cell phones. There
are two possible ways to con…gure four metal pins on the plug that will attach
a device to a phone. The four pins can be aligned in a single row or they can be
arranged in two rows. Call these technologies X and Y respectively. Technology
X is marginally better than Y: Under the status quo system, the SSO would
choose X. Then the patent owner would be able to set its royalty knowing that
it no longer faced competition from technology Y: Under the proposed ex ante
system, the SSO would …rst request licensing terms from both patent owners
and then select the best combination of technology and licensing terms. Thus,
4Robert Skitol provides an excellent description of the problem and summary of related
legal literature and …lings (Skitol, 2005). In 2002 the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission held joint hearings on "Competition and Intellectual Property Law and
Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy." Two of the sessions focused speci…cally on the issues
of licensing technology implicated by de jure standards set by SSOs. Transcripts and written
testimony of the hearings are available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/index.htm. Ex
ante licensing discussions were also at the center of a debate over the "Standards Development
Organization Advancement Act of 2004," a law which extended the "National Cooperative
Research Act" to limit the antitrust liability of registered SSOs as well as research joint
ventures. See (Schwartz & Gorman, 2004).
SSO members have also voiced a related complaint: some participants have allegedly vio-
lated rules that require them to disclose any patents that might read on the standard being
developed. This has been the subject of several high pro…le lawsuits. See Micron v. Rambus,
189 F.Supp.2d 201(D.Del. 2002); Rambus v. In…neon Technologies, 318 F.3d 1081, Fed. Cir.
2003; and the FTC’s suit against Union Oil Company of California, In re Union Oil Company
of California, No. 9305, March 2003.
5Relatively few disputes over "reasonable and non-discriminatory" licensing terms have
been settled by the courts. In one such case Rockwell International Corp. claimed that Mo-
torola Corporation’s licensing terms for patented technology incorporated in the ITU standard
for 33.6K modems were "unreasonable." See (Shapiro, 2000). In another court case, Sound-
view Technologies charged that Sony and other members of the Electronic Industries Alliance
(EIA) violated antitrust laws by collectively …xing royalties for Soundview’s patented tech-
nologies used in the "V-Chip," the standardized chip that the government requires to be
installed in all televisions to enable parents to block violent programming.
3if the terms o¤ered for technology Y were su¢ciently superior, the SSO would
select technology Y as the standard.
This process would allow SSO members to bene…t from increased compe-
tition between substitute technologies before they commit to one technology.
Without such ex ante competition, the SSO members su¤er from a holdup
problem similar to that examined in (Williamson, 1989) and (Grossman & Hart,
1986): after SSO members have made asset-speci…c investments (speci…c to a
patented technology) in developing and implementing a particular standard, the
patent owner is able to extract rents from those investments.6
Despite the potential advantages of ex ante competition, most large SSOs
have rules that explicitly prohibit any public discussions of licensing terms dur-
ing the standard setting process and many of their members have vigorously
opposed any change.7 At the 2002 Federal Trade Commission / Department of
Justice hearings on IP and antitrust, representatives from large …rms spoke on
both sides of the issue; some downplayed the frequency and importance of such
licensing hold up while others insisted that it is a signi…cant problem.8
Opponents of ex ante competition have argued that such licensing discus-
sions are likely to extend into areas that would be per se violations of antitrust
laws, such as agreements on product prices.9 Further, opponents contend that ex
ante competition would introduce many practical problems that would greatly
impede an already cumbersome standard setting process primarily because busi-
ness people and lawyers would be required to negotiate licensing terms and
ensure that discussions do not violate antitrust laws. Proponents of ex ante
competition argue that SSOs create market power for the IP owner when they
select its patented technology and that the SSO should be able to counter that
arti…cial market power through joint ex ante consideration of licensing terms.
Citing the possible e¢ciency justi…cations, proponents have sought guidance
from the antitrust agencies on the issue.10 Federal Trade Commission Chair-
6Carl Shapiro provided a de…nition of "holdup" in this context in (Federal Trade Commis-
sion and Department of Justice, 2002a) pp. 15-16. An amicus brief …led by Joseph Farrell and
other leading academics in the Federal Trade Commission’s Rambus proceeding also describes
holdup in the context of standard setting (Farrell, Joseph, et al., 2004).
7For example, IEEE policies state that "[t]he validity, terms, or cost of speci…c patent use"
should be avoided during standard setting meetings. However, the SSO rules do not explicitly
prohibit bilateral ex ante negotiations between an IP owner and a potential licensee. Even
so, to the extent that such bilateral negotiations are e¤ective they also dampen incentives to
innovate.
8For example, Scott Peterson of Hewlett-Packard spoke out in favor of allowing ex ante
licensing discussions. Carl Cargill of Sun Microsystems explained that RAND licensing terms
are not su¢ciently well de…ned. See (Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice,
2002b) on pp.246-251 and pp. 109-111. They were opposed by Earle Thompson of Texas
Instruments and Richard Holleman of the IEEE.
9See the testimony of Earle Thompson, Intellectual Asset Manager and Senior Counsel of
Texas Instruments and attorney Paul Vishny in (Federal Trade Commission and Department
of Justice, 2002a) pp.32-33 and p.44 respectively.
10(Lemely, 2002) provides an excellent in-depth review of current legal issues surrounding
SSOs and IP rights. (Lemely, 2002), (Curran, 2003), and (Gi¤ord, 2003) all make the case
that ex ante licensing discussions have potential e¢ciency justi…cations and thus should be
subject to a rule of reason analysis. Scott Peterson, of Hewlett-Packard, and Robert Skitol
4man Deborah Majoras has agreed that, "joint ex ante royalty discussions that
are reasonably necessary to avoid hold up do not warrant per se condemna-
tion." (Majoras, 2005) This echoes the view expressed in June 2005 by outgoing
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust R. Hewitt Pate.(Pate, 2005) The Eu-
ropean Commission has also indicated that it will study the issue.(European
Commission, 2005)
Aside from the practical and legal issues surrounding ex ante discussions,
there is a concern that adopting the ex ante system may harm welfare by damp-
ening innovation incentives. If SSO members extract more favorable terms from
IP owners by engaging in ex ante licensing discussions, then …rms will likely
invest less in researching and developing technologies that could form the ba-
sis of new standards.11 To analyze the e¤ects of adopting the ex ante system
one must assess both the social bene…ts of lower royalties and the social costs
of diminished innovation incentives.12 This paper develops a model of R&D
investment and standard setting to analyze the e¤ects of adopting the ex ante
system on the surpluses enjoyed by IP owners who license technology to manu-
facturers, manufacturers who buy licenses in order to produce an end product,
and consumers who purchase the end product. The model predicts that greater
competition between IP owners under the ex ante system bene…ts both con-
sumers and producers (manufacturers that buy licenses to use the technology)
as long as the cost of innovation is not "high." The model also predicts that
innovators (R&D …rms) are harmed by the competition introduced by the ex
ante system.
The remainder of this section provides a brief review of the economic litera-
ture on licensing, which forms the foundation of the model presented in this pa-
per. Section 2 outlines a three-stage model of R&D investment and collaborative
standard setting. Section 3 solves for the equilibrium innovation investments,
R&D pro…ts, producer pro…ts, and consumer surplus of the three-stage model
for two separate games: one without ex ante licensing competition, and one
with ex ante licensing competition. Section 4 compares the welfare outcomes of
the two games and Section 5 concludes.
1.1 Review of licensing literature
From its inception, formal modeling of optimal licensing has been concerned
with the relationship between licensing revenues and the amount of resources
allocated for innovation. Kenneth Arrow’s pioneering work relates an inventor’s
royalty revenues to the structure of the downstream market in which its licensees
compete (Arrow, 1962). In Arrow’s three-stage model, a single IP owner sets
call for Agency guidance in (Petersonn, 2002) and (Skitol, 2005).
11See (Holleman, 2002). Joseph Farrell also comments on the issue in (Federal Trade Com-
mission and Department of Justice, 2002a) pp. 47-48.
The same concern arises from some SSO policies that require participants to license any
patents covered by the standard royalty free or to transfer the ownership of covered patents
to the SSO itself.
12The tradeo¤ considered here is similar to the tradeo¤ implicit in granting patent protec-
tions. Market power is the currency with which society purchases innovation e¤ort.
5royalties for its cost-reducing innovation, then producers choose whether or
not to purchase a license, and …nally producers compete downstream.13 In
the 1980s, a series of papers began to apply variations of Arrow’s basic three-
stage model to questions about the optimal structure of licensing fees: Should
licensors charge lump-sum royalties, or per-unit royalties, or both? Should
licensors sell to all comers or limit the number of licenses they o¤er? Should
licensors auction o¤ a limited number of licenses?14 In his Handbook of Game
Theory chapter (Kamien, 1992), Morton Kamien provides an excellent summary
of several extensions of Arrow’s basic model developed by himself and various
coauthors as well as by Michael Katz, Carl Shapiro, and others. See (Kamien
& Tauman, 1992), (Kamien & Tauman, 1986), and (Kamien & Tauman, 2002).
Also see (Quelin et al. , 2001) for a summary of the literature on technology
standards in network industries, including (Katz & Shapiro, 1986a) and (Wang,
1998). Some of the extensions developed incorporate an initial stage in which
the licensor must …rst invest in R&D in order to develop the cost-reducing
technology.15
This paper makes several modi…cations to the basic model established in
the literature to address the new question of which standard setting system
yields the highest pro…ts, consumer surplus, and total welfare. To compare the
two standard setting systems, this paper develops two parallel versions of the
same theoretical model: one models the status quo system of standard setting
where industry standards are chosen without open competition over licensing
terms, while the other allows for ex ante competition in licensing terms before
the standard is chosen. The two models have the same three stages. First,
research and development …rms (R&D …rms) invest in innovation to develop
new technologies. Second, an SSO selects one of the new technologies as the
industry standard. Third, the SSO members compete in a Cournot market sell-
ing the standardized product. The Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE)
of each of these two models are solved through backward induction starting
with Cournot competition in the downstream market and the innovation e¤ort,
pro…ts, and welfare associated with each of the two games are compared.
The current model di¤ers from the literature in four important ways. First,
unlike the existing literature, where a single IP owner competes with an existing
free technology, the current model allows two R&D …rms to behave strategically
when investing in R&D and setting their royalty rates, somewhat like …rms en-
gaged in a patent race.16 Second, in the existing literature downstream …rms
13The model predicts that an owner of a cost-reducing innovation who charges a per-unit
royalty can earn higher pro…ts when the downstream market is competitive than when it is
monopolistic.
14(Katz & Shapiro, 1986c) does not explicitly model the downstream competition among
licensees.
15A new generation of licensing models, pioneered by (Segal, 1999), focuses on bilateral
licensing contracts in an environment where licensees (and even the licensor) compete in the
downstream market.
16Much of the literature on investment incentives and innovation considers patent races
(See (Tirole, 1995) pp. 394-399), where the …rst …rm to develop the technology (and patent
it) gets a monopoly payo¤. The current model has a similar "winner-take-all" element which
6can generally decline to license the new cost-reducing technology and to con-
tinue producing using the old, higher-cost (but royalty-free) production tech-
nology. This is not possible in the current model because a downstream …rm
that chooses not to take a license simply cannot legally sell the standardized
product in the downstream market. Third, some of the existing literature allows
for ‡exible licensing structures, but the current paper considers only per-unit
licenses. While this may be a strong assumption, it is probably appropriate
in the context of an SSO where IP owners routinely commit to licensing on
"non-discriminatory" terms.17 Fourth, the current model interprets innovation
as an advancement that increases a consumer’s willingness to pay (a common
interpretation of "quality"). Although most of the existing literature has inter-
preted innovations as reducing production costs, the basic Cournot model can
accommodate either interpretation.
2 A Model of R&D Investment and Collabora-
tive Standard Setting
The model proceeds in three stages. In the …rst stage, two R&D …rms simul-
taneously invest e¤ort in developing new technologies. The results of the R&D
e¤ort are not deterministic. Instead, each of the two …rms realizes an unidimen-
sional innovation that is a random draw from a distribution determined by the
…rm’s innovation e¤orts. A …rm that invests more draws its innovation from a
distribution that …rst order stochastically dominates the distribution of a …rm
that invests less. In the second stage, the R&D …rms submit their patented
innovations to an SSO, whose members then decide which of the two innova-
tions (technologies) to implement as the standard, and set per-unit royalty fees.
In the third stage, the licensees (producers) compete to sell the standardized
product in the downstream market.
The model is analyzed in the context of several important maintained hy-
pothesis. 1) The SSO members are homogeneous. 2) The two R&D …rms are
not SSO members. 3) Individual SSO members are not able to negotiate licens-
ing terms bilaterally with the R&D …rms either before or after the standard
has been set. 4) The SSO members make sunk investments in developing and
implementing the standard. 5) The patented technology is essential to imple-
menting the standard. 6) There are no alternative uses for the technologies;
speci…cally, neither R&D …rm is in a position to promote its technology as a
is common in models of patent races. In both the status quo model and the ex ante model,
the …rm that produces the greatest innovation becomes the monopoly provider of licenses in
equilibrium. However, unlike the patent race models, innovation occurs simultaneously so
neither …rm innovates …rst.
17There is an ongoing debate about the legal meaning of "nondiscriminatory" in this context.
It appears that uniform per-unit licensing fees are not considered discriminatory whereas
combinations of lump-sum and per-unit fees may be considered discriminatory. IP is often
licensed as a percentage of sales. However, equilibria solutions to the games using a percentage
royalty become intractable.
7de facto standard outside the structure of the SSO. 7) There is no uncertainty
regarding whether the R&D …rms’ patents cover the technologies in question.18
The …rst two maintained hypotheses are probably the most critical abstrac-
tions. In reality, SSO members are often a diverse group with individual vested
interests in the competing technologies. For example, IP owners themselves are
often SSO members and they actively promote their own technologies during
the standard setting process. These two maintained hypotheses abstract from
the complicated internal decision making process common in most SSOs because
the homogeneous SSO members in the model all agree on which technology to
choose. The third maintained hypothesis may be somewhat redundant given the
…rst two, but it is important to point out that bilateral licensing arrangements,
especially cross licensing, are common. The remaining maintained hypotheses
simply ensure that there is an interesting holdup problem and abstract from
some potential issues that would limit the applicability of the model in some
cases.
3 Solving for the SPNE Both With and Without
Ex Ante Licensing Competition
Two di¤erent standard setting systems are modeled using the same …rst and
last stages; the systems di¤er only in the structure of the second stage of the
model. Under the status quo "ex post licensing" game (G1); the SSO members
simply choose the best technology (the largest innovation drawn by the two
R&D …rms) and then the winning R&D …rm sets a revenue-maximizing roy-
alty. Under the proposed "ex ante licensing" game (G2); the two R&D …rms
commit to speci…c royalties before the SSO members choose one technology as
the industry standard. The di¤erent methods of selecting a standard induce
di¤erent equilibrium levels of investment, returns on R&D, pro…ts for the SSO
members, and consumer surpluses. Thus, the equilibrium outcomes of the two
parallel games can be compared to evaluate whether the welfare bene…ts of the
additional competition under the ex ante system exceed the harm of reduced
innovation. The SPNE equilibria can be found through backward induction,
starting with the third stage.
3.1 Stage Three: Downstream Cournot Competition
As is common in models of optimal licensing, consumer demand is given by the
simple inverse demand function
P = ﬁ ¡ Q; (1)
where P is the market clearing price and Q is the total quality of a homoge-
neous product. Although products are probably heterogeneous in reality, the
assumption of product homogeneity is somewhat plausible because the products
18Similar assumptions were made in (Besen, 2002).
8have to have at least one thing in common: they must adhere to the industry
standard. The parameter ﬁ represents the value that results from technological
innovations. As innovations improve the quality of the product, each customer’s
willingness to pay increases. The demand curve (1) suggests that di¤erent cus-
tomers value the basic product di¤erently, but that they all value improvements
in the product equally.
When N ¸ 2 producers compete in the downstream market their combined
Cournot equilibrium pro…ts are
…C (ﬁ;r) =
N
(N + 1)2 (ﬁ ¡ r)
2 ; (2)
where r is the positive per-unit royalty.19 The R&D …rm receives r for each of
the Q units sold by the downstream Cournot competitors (SSO members) and




(ﬁ ¡ r)r: (3)
In Stage Two, the R&D …rms choose r to maximize (3);the revenues that they
ultimately earn in Stage Three. Because G1 and G2 diverge in Stage Two, the
two games are considered separately in the next section.
3.2 Stage Two: G1
In the status quo game (G1) the SSO selects the best technology (the highest of
the two realizations of ﬁ) and the winning R&D …rm sets its royalty to maximize
(3). Let H denote the winning …rm and rM denote its monopoly royalty choice.
Setting the derivative of (3) with respect to r equal to zero yields the revenue
maximizing per-unit royalty rM = ﬁH
2 and corresponding licensing revenues





3.3 Stage Two: G2
Stage Two in the ex ante game (G2) is divided into two sub-parts. First the
R&D …rms set their royalties, and then the SSO chooses which technology to
incorporate into the standard. The SPNE of the stage is solved by backward
induction, starting with the SSO’s technology choice and then considering the
R&D …rms’ optimal royalties.
3.3.1 Technology Choice
When considering licensing terms ex ante, the SSO chooses the best combination
of technology (ﬁ) and per-unit royalty (r): To do so, the SSO members compare
19This is the same downstream market structure that Kamien employs in his 1992 summary
of the literature (Kamien, 1992). In reality, licensing terms have many more dimensions than
just price. For example, the licensing terms may restrict the use of the technology or account
for cross licenses.
9the total expected pro…ts of the N licensees, given the two (ﬁ;r) combinations
o¤ered by the R&D …rms.20 By inspection of (2), it is clear that downstream
industry pro…ts are higher when the SSO selects the R&D …rm that o¤ers the
higher value of (ﬁ ¡ r):21
3.3.2 Royalty Choice
In Stage Two of G2 the two R&D …rms compete in a Bertrand setting, each
lowering its royalty to undercut the other’s (ﬁ ¡ r) value. Let L denote the
…rm with the lower innovation value. The ability of Firm H to extract pro…ts is
limited by the willingness of Firm L to price at marginal cost, a royalty of zero.22
Let the superscript D indicate the duopoly royalty and pro…ts. However, when
the di¤erence between ﬁH and ﬁL is su¢ciently large, the SSO will choose Firm
H0s innovation even if Firm H charges the monopoly royalty. That is, Firm H
is e¤ectively a monopolist because Firm L would have to o¤er a negative royalty
to compete with it superior technology.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, the R&D …rm with the lesser innovation o¤ers
its license for free (equal to marginal cost). The R&D …rm with the superior
innovation charges rD = ﬁH¡ﬁL if ﬁL > ﬁH
2 and charges rM = ﬁH
2 if ﬁL · ﬁH
2 :
The SSO chooses Firm H0s technology as the standard.
Proof. When Firm H sets a royalty rate of rH = ﬁH ¡ ﬁL and Firm L sets a
rate of 0; then neither …rm can pro…tably deviate if ﬁL > ﬁH
2 : Firm L will earn
zero pro…ts at any positive royalty because it will not be selected by the SSO
and could only earn negative pro…ts from setting a negative royalty. Firm H
can increase its royalty (and thus pro…ts) up to ﬁH ¡ﬁL and its technology will
still be selected by the SSO. If Firm H sets a royalty greater than aH ¡ﬁL the
SSO will choose Firm L0s technology and Firm H will earn zero royalties.
However, if ﬁL · ﬁH
2 ; then aH ¡ﬁL would exceed the monopoly royalty rate
ﬁH
2 : Thus Firm H would maximize pro…ts by setting its royalty to ﬁH
2 : Firm L
could not pro…tably deviate for the same reasons described above.









Firm L0s equilibrium licensing revenues are zero because it is not selected by
the SSO. The R&D …rms consider the Stage Two pro…ts of G1 and G2 when
deciding how much e¤ort to invest in innovation e¤ort in Stage One.
20Because members of the SSO are homogeneous, this decision rule could be de…ned in
terms of aggregate or individual downstream pro…ts.
21Letting L denote the …rm with the lower innovation value, the SSO maximizes industry
pro…ts by choosing Firm H if (ﬁH ¡ rH) < (ﬁL ¡ rL):
22It is assumed that the costs of abandoning the chosen standard are su¢ciently high that
they do not constrain the winning R&D …rm’s royalty choice.
103.4 Stage One: Expected Pro…ts
The …rst stages of G1 and G2 are essentially the same; the forward-looking
R&D …rms make their innovation investment decisions in Stage One based on
the equilibrium royalty revenues they expect to earn in the subsequent stages.23
This decision depends on the relationship between the cost of innovation e¤ort
and the corresponding expected licensing revenues. In equilibrium, each R&D
…rm chooses an innovation e¤ort that is a best response to the other’s choice.
Because the R&D …rms’ expected pro…ts depend on the cost of the innovation
e¤ort they expend, it is necessary to establish the innovation process before fully
characterizing pro…ts.
3.4.1 The Innovation Process
The development of new technologies is an inherently uncertain process. Large
innovations may result from only a small amount of e¤ort just as large amounts
of e¤ort may yield only small innovations. However, in general, a …rm that
expends more e¤ort can expect to produce a larger innovation. To re‡ect the
uncertainty of the process, a …rm’s innovation, ﬁ; is modeled as a random draw.
Let j denote an R&D …rm.24 Firm j0s innovation, ﬁj; is drawn from
f (ﬁjj‚j) = ‚j (ﬁj)
‚j¡1 ; (5)
a family of probability density functions de…ned over the support ﬁj 2 [0;1]:
The di¤erent distributions in the family are distinguished by Firm j0s innovation
e¤ort, ‚j: It is useful to note that E [ﬁjj‚j] =
‚j
1+‚j: Thus, the expected marginal
product of innovation e¤ort ‚j is positive and decreasing.25 Finally, let the cost
of innovation e¤ort be speci…ed as a linear function of e¤ort, C (‚j) = c‚j:26
3.4.2 Expected Pro…ts
R&D …rms choose their innovation e¤orts in Stage One to maximize their ex-
pected pro…ts from royalties earned in subsequent stages. These expected roy-
alties depend on three factors: whether the …rm generates the best of the two
innovations (if it does not, it gets no future royalties in equilibrium); the ab-
solute level of its innovation (the greater its innovation, the more royalty revenue
it will earn); and, in the case of G2, the relative level of the …rm’s innovation
compared to the other R&D …rm’s innovation. These factors are captured in the
23The R&D …rms are assumed to be risk neutral.
24The j and ¡j subscripts replace the H and L subscripts because the …rms’ actual inno-
vations are not realized until the end of Stage One.
25It is easy to extend the model to account for di¤ering levels of productivity of innovation
e¤ort. If innovations are drawn from f (ﬁjj‚j) = ‰‚j (ﬁj)‰‚j¡1 ; then marginal changes in
‚j have a greater e¤ect of moving probability from the lower end of the distribution to the
higher end of the distribution when ‰ is higher.
26This linear speci…cation indicates that the R&D …rms have no monopsony power in the
market for innovation e¤ort (hiring engineers) and that there are no lumpy or sunk costs
associated with innovation e¤ort.
11following expected pro…t functions that integrate royalties over the two R&D
…rms’ distributions of ﬁ:
Expected Pro…ts: G1 In the equilibrium of G1 Firm j earns the monopoly
royalty, …M (ﬁj); conditional on the fact that it draws a higher innovation value











where the subscript ¡j denotes the other R&D …rm. The inner term of the
double integral integrates the monopoly royalty revenues of Firm j (with in-
novation ﬁj) over the truncated distribution of ﬁ¡j 2 (0;ﬁj): In this range,
Firm j0s technology would be selected by the SSO in equilibrium and Firm j
would earn royalties. The outer term integrates over the entire distribution of
ﬁj: Substituting the functional forms of f (ﬁjj‚j); …M (ﬁj); and C (‚j) into (6)








(2 + ‚j + ‚¡j)
¡ c‚j: (7)
Before turning to the equilibrium innovation e¤orts in G1 consider the expected
pro…ts in G2:
Expected Pro…ts: G2 The expected pro…t function for G2 is more complex
because the R&D …rm with the higher innovation will set the monopoly royalty
if its innovation is su¢ciently superior and the duopoly royalty if it is not. Thus
in (8) the inner term of the double integral is split into two terms. The …rst
is similar to the inner term in (6). However, (8) only integrates the monopoly






; the outcomes when Firm j would
price as a monopolist due to the superiority of its innovation. The second
integrates the duopoly royalty revenues over the truncated distribution of ﬁ¡j 2 ¡ﬁj
2 ;ﬁj
¢
; the outcomes when Firm j0s technology would still be selected by the
SSO but the …rm would be constrained to price as a duopolist. Again, the outer















Substituting the functional forms of f (ﬁjj‚j); …M (ﬁj); …D (ﬁj;ﬁ¡j); and









21+‚¡j (1 + ‚¡j)(2 + ‚¡j)(2 + ‚j + ‚¡j)
¡ c‚j:
(9)
123.5 Equilibrium Innovation E¤orts
The expected pro…t functions (7) and (9) imply that each game (G1 and G2)
has a unique symmetric SPNE level of innovation e¤ort in Stage One. This
result is established by setting the …rst order conditions (FOCs) of the expected
pro…t functions (taken with respect to ‚j) equal to zero and then solving the
resulting system of two equations and two unknowns.27











´2 = c: (10)











¢2 = c: (11)
In equilibrium both …rms’ FOCs must be satis…ed and thus, by inspection of
(11), ‚
¤
j must equal ‚
¤
¡j: Denote this symmetric equilibrium e¤ort as ‚
G1: Sub-
stituting ‚




¡j in (11) yields (10).











´3 = c: (12)













¢2 = c: (13)




¡j:28 This symmetric equilibrium











is monotonically decreasing in ‚
¤
j (for
27Only interior pro…t maximization solutions are considered here. The Appendix provides
a proof that corner solutions to the pro…t maximization problem can not be Nash equilibria
in either G1 or G2 if 1
8
N












































is monotonically decreasing in ‚¤
j, no two values of ‚¤
















j is the SPNE of G2:
13‚
¤
j > 0) there can be only one value of ‚
¤
j corresponding to any given ‚
¤
¡j:
Substituting the symmetric equilibrium e¤ort, ‚






As predicted, the equilibrium level of e¤ort is lower under the ex ante licens-
ing system.
Proposition 4 The equilibrium innovation e¤ort in G1 exceeds the equilibrium
innovation e¤ort in G2; or ‚
G1 > ‚
G2:
Proof. The value of the left-hand sides of (10) and (12) are monotonically
decreasing functions of ‚
G1 and ‚
G2 respectively. Thus, if the left-hand side
of (10) exceeds the left-hand side of (12) when ‚
G1 = ‚
G2; then when the left-
hand sides of (10) and (12) are both set to c; it must be true that ‚
G1 > ‚
G2:
Following a proof by contradiction, suppose that (10) evaluated at ‚ is smaller
than (12) evaluated at ‚: This implies that
¡
2 ¡ ‚ + ‚
2¢
< 21¡‚; (14)
which does not hold for ‚ > 0: For ‚
G1 = ‚
G2 > 0 the left-hand side of (10)
must exceed the left-hand side (12): Thus ‚
G1 must exceed ‚
G2 when (10) and
(12) hold.
4 The E¤ect of the Ex Ante System on Equilib-
rium Surpluses and Welfare
The equilibrium innovation e¤orts in each game determine the expected sur-
pluses of the R&D …rms, the downstream …rms, and consumers. (The formulas
for the producer and consumer surpluses are constructed in the same manner
as the expected R&D …rm pro…t functions described above and are given in
the Appendix.) After solving for the equilibrium innovation e¤orts and …nding
the corresponding surpluses, it is possible to evaluate the model’s predictions
regarding the e¤ects of adopting the ex ante licensing system on each group’s
surplus (and the total surplus) by comparing the G1 and G2 equilibrium results.
One would expect that adopting the ex ante system would decrease the
pro…ts of the R&D …rms because it introduces an additional element of com-
petition. Further, one would generally expect that consumers and downstream
…rms would bene…t from the additional competition among R&D …rms.29 The
equilibrium outcomes of the two games are generally consistent with these ex-
pectations. The model predicts that both consumers and downstream …rms are
better o¤ with the ex ante system unless the costs of innovation are "high" and
that R&D …rms are always worse o¤ with the ex ante system. The model also
predicts that the bene…ts of the ex ante system to consumers and downstream
29It is theoretically possible that additional competition among R&D …rms would induce
them to invest even more in innovation.
14…rms (and the harm to R&D …rms) are inversely related to the cost of innovation
e¤ort.
Ideally, one could analytically solve for the equilibrium innovation e¤orts
in each game (as functions of N and c) and then use those …ndings to solve
for the surpluses enjoyed by consumers, downstream producers and R&D …rms.
However, such a straightforward analytical approach is not possible in this case
because general analytic solutions for the equilibrium innovation e¤ort in G2 do
not exist. (Analytic solutions exist for particular combinations of the parame-
ters. For example, when N = 2 and c = 5
192 then (12) holds for ‚
G2 = 1:)
However, if one …xes the value of N it is possible to perform comparative
statics on the welfare e¤ects of adopting the ex ante system for di¤erent values
of c by expressing each of the surpluses in G1 as a function of ‚
G2: This can
be done by …rst inverting (10) to solve the G1 equilibrium condition for ‚
G1
as a function of c and then replacing c with the left hand side of (12); the
G2 equilibrium condition.30 The result gives ‚








can be substituted into the G1 surplus functions. Although
conceptually simple, this process produces algebraic monstrosities. Thus, it is
necessary to illustrate the resulting comparative statics using graphs. In the
graphs below N = 2:
Before doing so, it is useful to review the mechanics of this process, which
are illustrated in Figure 1. In the …rst panel of Figure 1, the horizontal axis
measures equilibrium innovation e¤ort and the vertical axis measures the cost
of innovation e¤ort. The curves labeled G1 and G2 plot the costs of innovation
that are associated with each equilibrium level of innovation e¤ort, as given by
the equilibrium equations (10) and (12).
30Solving (10) for ‚G1 yields
‚G1 =
¡(2￿ ¡ 1) +
p
(2￿ ¡ 1)2 ¡ 8￿
2￿
;
where ￿ = 16 N
N+1c:
15Consumer Surplus and Costsin G1 and G2
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For example, the intersection labeled A indicates that when ‚
G2 =1 then c =
0:026: Despite the fact that it is on the vertical axis, c is clearly the independent
variable, not the dependent variable. Because (10) can be inverted to express
‚
G1 and a function of c, one can …nd the ‚
G1 associated with the cost given
by intersection A. The intersection labeled B gives this point as ‚
G1 ¼ 1:3: In
the second panel of Figure 1, the curves labeled G1 and G2 plot the consumer
surplus associated with the equilibrium level of e¤ort in each of the two games,
as given by (15) and (16) in the Appendix. By comparing the heights of the
intersections labeled Ap and Bp; which give the consumer surpluses associated
with ‚
G2 =1 and ‚
G1 ¼ 1:3; which are in turn associated with c = 0:026, it is
clear that consumer surplus is greater under the ex ante system when c = 0:026:
Using the substitution process described above, Figure 2 illustrates the equi-
librium consumer surplus for a range of G2 equilibrium e¤orts. Because ‚
G2
depends on the cost of innovation e¤ort one can use this …gure to compare con-
16sumer surplus over a range of possible values of c even though the results do
not allow for a direct algebraic relationship between changes in c and changes
in consumer surplus.31
The line labeled G2 in Figure 2 simply plots the equilibrium consumer sur-
plus (equation (16) in the Appendix) for each equilibrium level of innovation
e¤ort, ‚
G2. The line labeled "Cost" relates each level of c to the resulting e¤ort







, the line labeled G1 plots the equilibrium consumer surplus in
G1 for each ‚
G2: For any particular c; the Cost curve yields the equilibrium ef-
fort, ‚
G2 (c): The G2 curve gives consumer surplus in G2 when e¤ort is ‚
G2 (c):







In words, the G1 curve gives the consumer surplus from the equilibrium e¤ort
that R&D …rms would make in G1 when costs are such that R&D …rms would
make e¤ort ‚
G2 (c) in G2:
Figure 2 illustrates that the consumer surplus in G2 exceeds the consumer
surplus in G1 for most levels of c: However, careful examination of the G1 and
G2 curves near the origin reveals that the consumer surplus generated in G1 is
actually slightly greater than in G2 when ‚
G2 is very low, which occurs when the
cost of innovation e¤ort is "high." The straight dashed lines highlight the …nding
that the two systems result in the same consumer surplus when c = 0:064:
For innovation costs above that level (but less than 1
8
N
N+1) G1 yields slightly
higher consumer surplus. The graph also reveals that the di¤erence between
the consumer surplus generated in G2 and the consumer surplus generated in
G1 increases as costs fall below 0:064: Thus the model predicts that, as long
as the costs of innovation e¤ort are not "too high," the expected bene…ts to
consumers of the additional competition between the R&D …rms, under the ex
ante system, outweigh the costs of having less expected innovation. Moreover,
the absolute e¤ect of introducing more competition is larger when innovation
costs are smaller and expected innovations are larger.
31As discussed in the Appendix, if c ¸ 1
8
N
N+1 then neither R&D …rm invests in innovation
e¤ort in either game’s equilibrium, and thus consumer surplus is zero in both games.
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An equivalent (unreported) graph shows a similar pattern for the aggregate
surplus of the downstream producers, which (given the Cournot construction)
is simply 2
N times the consumer surplus. Unsurprisingly, an equivalent graph
also reveals that R&D …rm surplus is higher in G1; when there is no ex ante
competition in licensing terms, than in G2 for all levels of c: Thus, comparing
the total welfare results of the two systems yields the same qualitative result:
total welfare is greater under G2 except for when c is "high." The break-even c
for total welfare is slightly lower than 0:064 because total welfare incorporates
the fact that R&D …rms are always better o¤ without the ex ante system.
As one would expect, equivalent graphs of consumer surplus using larger val-
ues of N reveal that consumers bene…t from increased downstream competition.
Such graphs also indicate that consumers gain more from the ex ante system
when N is larger: the downstream …rms pass on a greater share of the reduction
in royalties achieved through the ex ante system. Although, the break-even level
of innovation e¤ort (approximately 0.166 in Figure 2) is independent of N, that
e¤ort level is associated with higher c when N is larger.
It is worth noting that the SSO members would not favor the ex ante sys-
tem if they knew that innovation costs were "high." However, the actual cost
of innovation e¤ort is probably unknown. Thus it would be appropriate to con-
sider the expected welfare e¤ects of adopting the ex ante system taken over a
distribution of possible innovation costs. Given that the ex ante system has a
very small social cost over a small range of possible realizations of c and much
larger bene…ts over all other (smaller) realizations of c; it seems most plausible
that adopting the ex ante system would have a positive expected welfare e¤ect.
185 Conclusion
There has been heated debate over whether SSOs should engage in ex ante dis-
cussions of licensing terms before selecting among the alternative technologies.
In addition to many practical and legal arguments, some who oppose the in-
troduction of ex ante licensing competition argue that it would diminish social
welfare by reducing incentives to innovate. However, the welfare e¤ects of re-
duced innovation should be weighed against the welfare bene…ts of increased
competition among IP owners. To assess the relative magnitudes of the com-
petition e¤ect and innovation e¤ect on social and consumer welfare, this paper
develops a simple three stage model that can be used to analyze both the sta-
tus quo system (without ex ante licensing competition) and the ex ante system
(with ex ante licensing competition). The model predicts that the ex ante sys-
tem generally results in lower innovation e¤ort and lower pro…ts for R&D …rms,
but higher consumer surplus and pro…ts for downstream licensees.
196 Appendix
Proof. There are no equilibria where ‚¡j = 0 and ‚j > 0 in Stage One of




Suppose that Firm ¡j chooses ‚¡j = 0: Then Firm j0s pro…ts in the two
games are equivalent (given by E[…G1
j (‚jj0;N)] and E[…G2
j (‚jj0;N)]) and can












Corollary 5 If c > 1
8
N
(N+1) then ‚¡j = ‚j = 0 is the only equilibrium in Stage
One of G1 or G2:
6.1 Equilibrium Expected Consumer Surplus
Consumer surplus in Stage Three is given by 1
2 (ﬁ ¡ P)Q where ﬁ is the value of
the technology selected by the SSO. Substituting in the Stage Three equilibrium










The expected values of equilibrium consumer surplus can be found by …rst
replacing …M (ﬁj) and …D (ﬁj) in (6) and (8) with CS (ﬁ;r(ﬁ)), with the ap-
propriate equilibrium value of r(ﬁ). This yields the expected consumer surplus
when Firm j0s technology is selected by the SSO in G1 and G2; respectively. To
…nd the total expected consumer surplus one must add the expected consumer
surplus when Firm ¡j0s technology is selected by the SSO in each game. Sub-
stituting the equilibrium innovation e¤orts chosen by both R&D …rms into the























































Because the combined Cournot pro…ts of the downstream …rms are simply 2
N
times CS (ﬁ); the equilibrium downstream pro…ts can be found directly from
(15) and (16):
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